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S. Ct. 1246 at 1265. In the Rehnquist opinion, the Court differentiated
between potentially harmless errors errors which affect only the
procedure of the trial, and structural errors which violate due process
requirements so severely that their commission can never be harm-
less. Formerly, coerced confessions were generally held to be in the
latter category and so automatically invalidated the conviction. Payne
v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958). The portion of the opinion authored
by the Chief Justice held that coerced confessions, once considered
institutional violations of the accused's due process rights, now may
be scrutinized under the more lenient "harmless error" standard. The
portion of the Court's opinion delivered by Justice White applied the
harmless error standard, held that the confession to Sarivola was not
harmless under these facts, and affirmed the Arizona supreme court's
reversal and remand of Fulminante's conviction.
ANALYSIS / APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Arizona v. Fulminante is important because it changes what had
been a well established principle of criminal law. For nearly half a
century any reliance on a coerced confession invalidated the convic-
tion even if there existed enough evidence apart from the confession
to convict the defendant. See 111 S. Ct. at 1253 (dissenting opinion
of Justice White providing history of decisions leading up to this
case). The majority specifically reversed this tenet of law: "It is
evident from a comparison of the constitutional violations which we
have held subject to harmless error, and those which we have held not,
that involuntary statements or confessions belong in the former
category." Id. at 1265.
However, the majority decision authored by Justice White ap-
plied the harmless error ruling to Fulminante's case and held that the
admission of the confession to Sarivolain the prison was not harmless.
Id. at 1257. The Court noted that in order to determine that a
constitutional error is harmless, the Court must be satisfied on de novo
review that the federal constitutional error was "harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt". Id., citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 24
(1967). The Court expressly stated that a confession where the
defendant discloses the motive and means of a crime requires the
reviewing court to "exercise extreme caution before determining that
the admission of the confession at trial was harmless" because of the
temptation it creates in the mind of the jury to find guilt. 111 S. Ct.
at 1258. In addition to looking at the prejudicial effect of the
confession upon the fact finder, the Court looked at the likelihood that
the confession prejudiced the defendant at the sentencing phase of the
trial. The Court also pointed out that in Fulminante's case, the
sentencer relied on the defendant's confession to establish otherwise
uncorroborated aggravating factors necessary for a capital sentence.
Id. at 1260.
The importance of this decision on the capital defense bar is not
inconsequential, especially when taken in conjunction with other
recent Supreme Court Decisions. The Court, even as it scales back the
scope of reversible error, is maintaining real constitutional protec-
tions through strict scrutiny of harmless error issues. Yates v. Evatt,
111 S. Ct. 1884 (1991) andSatterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988),
with Fulminante, demonstrate the difficulty of the state's showing
that a constitutional error is harmless. In Yates v. Evatt the Court held
that unconstitutionally prejudicial jury instructions shifting the bur-
den of proof to the defendant are subject to harmless error review. The
state in this case, however, was unable to meet the burden of showing
that the error was not harmless, and relief was granted. Likewise,
Satterwhite v. Texas held that violations of a sixth amendment right to
counsel during psychiatric examination are subject to harmless error
evaluation, but that the state had failed to carry its burden of proof.
Counsel should be aware that although they may encounter
harmless error evaluation of constitutional error on direct appeal, it is
by no means a losing position. The Supreme Court has consistently
held against the state if it cannot demonstrate that the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. A defendant's case is even
stronger, and counsel should argue even more forcefully, when the
constitutional error violates fundamental rights. As the division of the
Court in this case demonstrates, where errors affecting these rights are
concerned, defendants may successfully argue for relief.
Summary and analysis by:
Peter T. Hansen
SCHAD v. ARIZONA
111 S. Ct. 2491 (1991)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
A highway worker discovered the decomposed body of Lorimer
Grove, strangled with a rope around his neck, on the side of an Arizona
highway. The victim had last been seen eight days earlier driving his
Cadillac. The next month, New York State Police stopped Edward
Schad, Jr. for speeding in Grove's Cadillac. Schad explained that he
was transporting the car for a friend named Larry Grove. Schad was
later arrested in Utah for a parole violation and possession of a stolen
vehicle. Police found several of the victim's belongings in the
Cadillac, in Schad's wallet, and in an abandoned rental car which
Schad had rented several months earlier and never returned.
The applicable Arizona statute defines first degree murder as
"murder which is... wilful, deliberate or premeditated ... or which
is committed... in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate...
robbery." Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-452 (Supp. 1973). Schad was
convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. The convic-
tion was set aside on collateral review and remanded for further
proceedings. 142 Ariz. 619, 691 P.2d 710 (1984). At Schad's retrial,
the prosecutor advanced theories of both premeditated murder and
felony-murder in support of conviction and the deathpenalty. Schad's
defense was that the circumstantial evidence proved him at most a
thief, but not a killer. Schad's attorney requested ajury instruction on
the lesser-included offense of theft, but the court refused. The court
did, however, instruct the jury on the offense of second-degree
murder. The court also instructed the jury that a verdict convicting the
defendant of first degree murder had to be unanimous, but the court
did not require unanimity as to whether the defendant was guilty of
premeditated murder or felony-murder. Under the court's instruc-
tions, the jury found Schad guilty and sentenced him to death.
At his appeal, Schad claimed, inter alia, that his federal consti-
tutional rights under the sixth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments
were violated, in that: (1) the court failed to require unanimity
regarding the separate crimes of premeditated murder and felony-
murder, and (2) the court failed to instruct thejury on robbery, alesser-
included offense of felony-murder, as required by Beck v. Alabama,
447 U.S. 625 (1980). The Arizona Supreme Court rejected Schad's
arguments and affirmed the second conviction. Schad v. State, 163
Ariz. 411,788 P.2d 1162 (1989). As to the defendant's first claim, the
court ruled that first-degree murder was "one crime regardless whether
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it occurs as a premeditated murder or a felony murder." Id. at 417,788
P.2d 1168. As a result, the court determined that Schad was "not
entitled to a unanimous verdict on the precise manner in which the
act was committed." Id. (emphasis added). The court also rejected
Schad's claim that Beck required a jury instruction on the lesser-
included offense of robbery. Id. at 416-417, 788 P.2d 1167-1168.
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and af-
firmed the lower court's holding in a 5-4 decision. Justice Souter
wrote for himself and three others in a plurality opinion regarding the
failure to require unanimity between premeditated murder and felony-
murder. Justice Scalia filed a separate concurring opinion on that
issue. Justice Souter wrote for a five member majority on the issue of
whether Beck v. Alabama required a jury instruction on robbery.
The plurality upheld the Arizona Court's ruling with respect to
the first issue, embracing that court's questionable rationale that
premeditated murder and felony-murder are "mere means" of accom-
plishing the same crime. Schad v. Arizona, 111 S. Ct. at 2497 (1991).
In support of this theory, Justice Souter relied on his conclusion that
premeditated murder and felony-murder are actually "alternative
mental states, the one being premeditation, the other the intent
required for murder combined with the commission of an inde-
pendently culpable felony." Id. (emphasis added). Souter then
analogized the case to a line of cases holding that ajury need not agree
as to means of satisfying the actus reus element of an offense. The
plurality announced that due process is satisfied without requiring
unanimity on differing "means" of committing an offense, so long as
those means are of "equivalent blameworthiness or culpability." Id. at
2503. In the opinion of four justices, premeditated murder and felony-
murder satisfied this "moral equivalence" test. Id.
Justice Scalia's concurrence criticized the plurality's reasoning.
As he pointed out, the "moral equivalence" test would permit a jury
to convict under a single charge that "the defendant assaulted either
X on Tuesday or Y on Wednesday." Id. at 2507 (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the result). According to Scalia, such a
charge would be impermissible despite the obvious "moral equiva-
lence" of the two acts. Under Scalia's view, Schad's conviction
comported with due process simply because the dual charge which
includes premeditated murder and felony-murder is a historical prac-
tice. Id. Justice Scalia's philosophy is that traditions and past
practices themselves define what "process" is "due." Id. Comment-
ing that the dual charge of Schadhas been common in most states since
before the adoption of the fourteenth amendment itself, Justice Scalia
found that the practice satisfied due process. Id.
On the second issue, a majority of five held that Schad was not
entitled to a jury instruction on robbery under Beck v. Alabama, 447
U.S. 625 (1980). In Beck, the court held that a statute which prohibits
any instruction on a lesser-included offense in a capital case is
unconstitutional. At Schad's trial, the court instructed the jury on the
lesser-included offense of second-degree murder, but refused to
instruct on the lesser-included offense of robbery. Schad claimed that
there was evidence of theft or robbery and that the due process
principles underlying Beck entitled him to an instruction on every
lesser-included offense which was supported by the evidence.
The Court stated thatBeck's fundamental concern was that ajury
convinced of the defendant's guilt in committing a violent crime but
not convinced of the defendant's guilt of the capital crime itself, might
nevertheless convict the defendant of the capital crime where the sole
alternative was to set the defendant free. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2504.
Beck held unconstitutional a mandatory all-or-nothing choice be-
tween conviction for capital murder and innocence. Considered in
this light, the Court rejected Schad's argument based on the fact that
at his trial, there was no such all-or-nothing choice. Id. at 2505.
Because the jury had the option of convicting Schad of second degree
murder, and chose not to, the court determined that no Beck problem
existed. Id.
ANALYSIS / APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
The plurality opinion represents at best an inordinate degree of
deference to an unreasonable state court ruling, and at worst a gross
abandonment of the principle embodied within In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 364 (1970), that due process requires "proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which [the defendant] is charged." Justice Souter's opinion holds that
it is not necessary for a convicting jury to determine whether the
defendant is guilty of (1) premeditated murder, with the elements of
an unlawful killing, malice and premeditation, or (2) felony-murder,
with the elements of an unlawful killing during a felony. Under the
trial court's instructions to the jury at Schad's trial, it is quite possible
that six jurors believed the defendant innocent of felony-murder,
while six others believed that he lacked premeditation. The court's
instructions did not require proof of every element of either offense.
Instead, they mix two distinct and separate crimes together and permit
the jury to convict based on an unknowable combination of elements.
Allowing a conviction to stand under such circumstances flies in the
face of Winship.
Fortunately, this portion of the Schad opinion will be of no
consequence to Virginia attorneys. Every component of the Virginia
capital murder statute requires both a finding of a "willful, deliberate,
and premeditated killing," and one of nine other circumstances, most
of them felonies in themselves. Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31 (1990).
Thus, the alternative dual charge which gave rise to the court's ruling
in Schad could not meet the requirements of Virginia's statute.
On its face, the majority's reasoning with respect to the Beck
issue seems tenable, but it neglects a major fact. The majority
concludes that there is no danger that the jury convicted Schad in an
"all-or-nothing" type scenario because it had the option to convict him
of second degree murder. However, Schad was charged with both
premeditated murder and felony-murder, yet second degree murder is
a lesser-included offense of premeditated murder only. If the jury
believed that Schad was innocent of premeditated murder, but guilty
of a violent robbery, then the instructions did indeed present the jury
with an all-or-nothing dilemma. Under such a scenario, ajuror's only
options, consistent with his/her oath, were (1) to convict Schad of
capital murder, or (2) to set him free. This is exactly the situation
sought to be remedied by Beck. The majority completely ignores this
fact and allows the conviction and sentence to stand.
Again, this ruling is not likely to affect any aspect of a Virginia
attorney's practice. The reason that Beck did not afford relief to
defendant Schad was that Arizona's statutory scheme allowed the
prosecution to proceed under alternative theories of either premedi-
tated murder or felony-murder, and the court instructed the jury as to
a lesser-included offense for only one of them. In Virginia, both
premeditation and a felony are required for the commission of a
capital offense. It would be impossible for a court to instruct on a
lesser-included offense for only one of two potential capital murder
theories when only one combined theory is available. A capital
defendant in Virginia must necessarily be charged with a willful,
deliberate, premeditated killing in the commission of one of nine
felonies. Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31 (1990). Nevertheless, attorneys
should take note of the point emphasized in Beck and altered some-
what by Schad. A capital defendant is entitled to ajury instruction for
a lesser-included offense, where that offense is supported by the
evidence, in order to eliminate the threat of an all-or-nothing choice
for the jury.
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A recent example of an appropriate lesser-included offense
instruction in Virginia is Moats v. Commonwealth, 404 S.E.2d 244
(Va. App. 1991). In Moats, the appellant held a store clerk at
gunpoint, demanded money, and shot and killed the victim. Moats
was indicted for capital murder but convicted for first degree murder
under an instruction for that lesser-included offense. Moats claimed
that the evidence did not support the first degree murder instruction.
However, the jury could have found that Moats fired without pre-
meditation, perhaps as a fearful response to an action of the store
clerk. The court thus correctly found that the instruction on first
degree murder (here, felony-murder) was supported by the evidence
and properly given. Id. While unpremeditated felony murder is not
capital murder in Virginia, evidence in a particular case may suggest
it as a lesser-included offense of capital murder.
Attorneys should continue to request lesser-included offense
instructions for first degree murder, second degree murder and the
underlying felony when the evidence supports such instructions.
When appropriate, attorneys should request an instruction requiring a
determination on the underlying felony before the jury proceeds to the
capital murder charge.
Summary and analysis by:
G. Douglas Kilday
PAYNE v. TENNESSEE
111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
Payne was charged and convicted of the first-degree murders of
Charisse Christopher and her two-year-old daughter. He was also
convicted of the first-degree assault with intent to murder Christopher's
son, Nicholas, who was three years old at the time of the crimes and present
during the murders of his mother and sister. At the penalty stage of the
trial, the State called Nicholas' grandmother to testify as to the effect the
murders had had on the surviving child. During closing arguments, the
prosecutor also commented on the effects Nicholas had suffered from
witnessing the murders as well as the effects of the loss of his mother and
sister. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed Payne's conviction and
sentence, thereby rejecting his argument that the grandmother's and
prosecutor's statements violated his eighth amendment rights set forth in
Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) and South Carolina v. Gathers,
490 U.S. 805 (1989). See case summary of South Carolina v. Gathers,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1991). The Tennessee Supreme
Court held that, although the grandmother's testimony was "technically
irrelevant," it "did not create a constitutionally unacceptable risk of an
arbitrary imposition of the death penalty and was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt." 11l S. Ct. 2597, 2604 (1991).
HOLDING
The Supreme Court overruled both Booth and Gathers, holding that
the eighth amendment does not bar the admission of victim impact
evidence during the penalty phase of a capital trial. Although a defendant
may offer any mitigating evidence in the sentencing phase, Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, (1976) (holding that capital defen-
dants must be afforded individualized due process), the Payne Court
reasoned that a defendant is not entitled to "that consideration wholly apart
from the crime which he committed." 111 S. Ct. at 2607. Woodson, the
Court noted, did not hold that a State may not offer evidence pertaining to
the life of the victim, the loss to the victim's family and/or the loss to
society, Woodson merely held that the defense may offer, with virtually
no limits, evidence about the defendant's own circumstances. TheBooth
decision, holding that a State may not introduce victim impact evidence,
the Court noted, unfairly weighted the process in favor of the defendant.
The Court also held, contrary to Gathers, that prosecutors may argue
victim impact to the sentencing jury. The Court stated that the decision of
whether to allow victim impact evidence is to be left to the individual
states.
ANALYSIS / APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Booth and Gathers, the Payne Court reasoned, were based on two
premises: that the "blameworthiness" of a defendant is not generally
reflected by evidence of harm suffered by a victim of the crime, and that
only evidence showing "blameworthiness" is relevant to the decision of
whether or not to impose the death penalty. Thus Booth held that victim
impact statements could only be used as evidence if the statement directly
related to the circumstances of the crime or the character of the individual
defendant. 482 U.S. at 508. If victim impact statements do not relate
directly to the circumstances of the crime or the character of the defendant,
they create a risk that capital punishment will be imposed arbitrarily.
Booth, 482 U.S. at 505. Gathers extended the Booth rule to prosecutors'
penalty phase statements regarding victims.
Yet Justice Rehnquist reasoned that victim impact evidence is
"designed to show each victim's 'uniqueness as an individual human
being."' 111 S.Ct. at 2607 (emphasis in original). Victim impact evi-
dence, Rehnquist argued, balances the proceedings by counteracting the
mitigating evidence that the defendant is allowed to present at the penalty
phase; in fact, Rehnquist argued that victim impact evidence may be
"necessary to determine the proper punishment for a first-degree mur-
der." Id. at2608 (emphasis added). Rehnquist noted that the 1987 Federal
Sentencing Guidelines use factors that relate to both subjective guilt and
the harm caused by the defendant's crime. He also noted today's politi-
cally active victims' rights groups.
One theme inJustice Souter's concurring opinion is arguably consis-
tent with Booth and Gathers: both of those cases required that evidence of
aggravating circumstances be relevant to the increased culpability of the
defendant. Souter argued first that "murder has foreseeable conse-
quences. When it happens, it is always to distinct individuals, and after it
happens other victims are left behind." Id. at 2615. The fact that the
defendant did not know details of the victim's, or the victim's survivors',
lives should not obscure the fact that murder has foreseeable conse-
quences, Souter reasoned.
Souter's second argument was that victim impact-type evidence is
heard at the guilt phase of the trial and "will be in the jurors' minds at the
sentencing stage." Id. at 2617. He failed to mention, however, that the
elements of the crime define what evidence is relevant at the guilt phase
of a trial. At the penalty phase, other evidence is relevant.
In ruling on what the eighth amendment requires, Payne, as a matter
of Federal and Constitutional law, now allows victim impact evidence and
argument at the penalty stage of a capital trial. The Court left it up to the
